Claude Certified Architect – Foundations Practice Question 98: MCP Remote OAuth
Claude Certified Architect, Foundations · Test 10 · question 8 of 10
A company hosts an internal MCP server over HTTP so that engineers' Claude clients can query a customer database. Today every engineer's config contains the same long-lived shared API key, so the server cannot tell users apart, and revoking one person's access means rotating the key for everyone. The security team wants per-user identity, short-lived credentials, and scoped access, in line with the MCP specification. Which design fits?
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Answer:
C is correct. For HTTP-based transports the MCP authorization specification (optional, but what implementations SHOULD follow when they use HTTP) has the MCP server act as an OAuth 2.1 resource server. It MUST implement OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata so clients can discover the authorization server, and it MUST validate that access tokens were issued specifically for it as the intended audience. Users authenticate with the authorization server, which issues tokens tied to a user and scopes, so access is per person and can be revoked individually.
A is wrong because a stdio server is a local process, for which the spec says to retrieve credentials from the environment; a shared key there still gives no per-user identity. B is wrong because token passthrough is explicitly forbidden: servers must accept only tokens meant for themselves and must not pass the received token to upstream APIs (the confused deputy problem). D is wrong because the spec says access tokens MUST NOT be included in the URI query string, and weekly rotation of a shared key still gives no per-user identity.
Reference: Authorization - Model Context Protocol specification