DOP-C02 Practice Question 96: Resource Control Policies Data Perimeter
AWS Certified DevOps Engineer – Professional (DOP-C02) · Test 10 · question 6 of 10
A company's AWS Organization already uses service control policies (SCPs) to restrict what IAM principals inside member accounts are allowed to do. A security review finds a gap: nothing stops an external party, someone who has obtained a leaked access key belonging to a third party outside the organization, from successfully reading objects in an S3 bucket that belongs to a member account, because SCPs only constrain principals that are themselves inside the organization. The company wants every S3 bucket, KMS key, and Secrets Manager secret in the organization to reject requests from any principal outside the organization, enforced centrally and unable to be overridden by a bucket policy in a single account.
Which control closes this gap?
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Answer:
Resource control policies are the organization-wide guardrail designed for exactly this gap. An SCP restricts what a principal that is itself part of the organization can do, but it has no effect on a principal external to the organization, because that external principal was never subject to the organization's SCPs in the first place. An RCP is evaluated on the resource side: it sets the maximum available permissions on supported resource types (S3, KMS, STS, SQS, and Secrets Manager among them) for every request that reaches them, including requests from outside the organization, and a member account's own resource policy cannot grant more than the RCP allows. Attaching one at the root enforces the perimeter centrally, without needing to edit a policy in every account.
Option A requires editing IAM policy in every member account, which does not scale, is not centrally enforced, and can be bypassed by an account admin whose account is compromised; the requirement explicitly wants a control the account level cannot override.
Option B strengthens an SCP, but SCPs still only bind principals inside the organization. A leaked third-party key belongs to a principal outside the organization, so no SCP can constrain what that principal is allowed to request.
Option C blocks public access configurations for S3 buckets specifically, which helps against accidental public exposure but does nothing for KMS or Secrets Manager, and does not stop a credentialed external principal that a bucket policy explicitly (even if unintentionally) grants access to.
Reference: Resource control policies (RCPs)