GCP Associate Cloud Engineer Practice Question 70: Workload Identity Federation CI/CD
Google Cloud Associate Cloud Engineer · Test 7 · question 10 of 10
A company runs its build pipeline in GitHub Actions and needs the pipeline to deploy artifacts to a Google Cloud project. Security policy forbids creating or downloading any service account JSON keys, and any credential the pipeline uses must be short-lived. The pipeline currently has no Google Cloud identity of its own.
What should you configure to let the pipeline authenticate to Google Cloud?
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Answer:
Workload Identity Federation lets an external workload, such as a GitHub Actions job, an AWS workload, or another identity provider, exchange its own OIDC or SAML token for a short-lived Google Cloud access token, with no service account key ever created or stored. A workload identity pool holds the external identities, and a workload identity provider inside that pool defines how Google Cloud validates GitHub's OIDC tokens (issuer, audience, and attribute mapping/condition). Granting the mapped external identity roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser on a service account lets the pipeline impersonate that service account and receive a token that expires quickly, satisfying both the no-keys and short-lived-credential requirements.
A is exactly what the policy forbids: a downloaded JSON key is a long-lived credential that never expires on its own and is a common source of leaked credentials. C is unrelated; a VPN tunnel provides network connectivity, not authentication, and would not authorize any Google Cloud API call by itself. D grants a standing, overly broad role to every engineer's group instead of a scoped, short-lived credential to the pipeline itself, violating least privilege and leaving a permanent grant in place regardless of whether the pipeline is even running.
Reference: Workload identity federation